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Abstract 
In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the 
shared memory of TrustZone.  We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy 
between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we 
suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of 
TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks. Also, we proposed security information 
flow control based on the Clark-Wilson model, and built the information flow control 
mechanism using Authentication Tokenization Program (ATP). Accordingly we can 
expect the improved integrity of the information content between REE and TEE on 
mobile devices. 
 
Introduction 
TrustZone is hardware-based security built into system-on-chips (SoCs) by 
semiconductor chip designers. Main theme of TrustZone is the concept of secure and 
non-secure worlds that are hardware separated, with non-secure software blocked 
from accessing secure resources directly [1], [2]. Within the processor, software either 
resides in the secure world (or trusted execution environment TEE) or the non-secure 
world (rich execution environment REE); a switch between these two worlds is 
accomplished via software referred to as the secure monitor or by the core logic. This 
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concept of TEE and REE extends beyond the processor to encompass memory, 
software, bus transactions, interrupts and peripherals within SoC [3]. 
Figure 1 illustrates TrustZone’s software architecture in a mobile device. REE’s 
mobile OS accesses TEE via a TrustZone library and a hardware driver. In the TEE, 
trusted applications execute on top of a minimal runtime environment, called the 
trusted OS, which provides a TEE internal application program interface (API) that 
trusted applications can use for communication with REE applications to access 
cryptographic operations and secure storage functionality. The trusted OS can enforce 
access control on trusted applications that attempt to access the secure memory [4], 
[5], [6]. TrustZone architecture does not define how REE applications access TEE [4].  
 
Shared Memory in TrustZone 
Typically, TEE includes three types of hardware models: 1) separated hardware REE 
and TEE 2) integrated REE and TEE 3) REE and TEE having shared hardware [7]. 
TrustZone is configured to include the shared hardware, referring to figure 2. Access 
of the shared hardware is determined according to the encrypted bit NS-bit.  
Particularly, REE and TEE share a main memory, for example, Dynamic 
Random Access Memory (DRAM). That is, DRAM is the memory shared by REE 
and TEE. NS-bit indicates whether to access one of the nonsecure area of DRAM and 
the secure area of DRAM [8]. The secure area is a space to store data encrypted by 
crypto algorithms. 
 
Side-channel Attack in Shared Memory 
Recently, Ning Zhang, Kun Sun, Deborah Shands, Wenjing Lou, and Y. Thomas Hou 
addressed the side-channel attack against the shared memory of TrustZone [9]. This 
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side-channel attack is referred as TruSpy, which is the first study of timing based 
cache side-channel information leakage of TrustZone. TruSpy attack exploits the 
cache contention between REE and TEE as a cache timing side channel to extract 
sensitive information from the secure world, referring to figure 3. There are two 
attack requirements for the TruSpy attack.  Firstly, the attacking process can fill in 
cache lines at individual cache sets that will cause cache contention between REE and 
TEE. Secondly, the attacker can detect the state change in the cache lines [9].  
 
The TruSpy attack scenario consists of five steps below [9], [10], referring to 
Figure 4: 
The first step is to identify the cache memory to use for cache priming. The key 
is to find the cache memory that will be filled in cache line that is also used by the 
victim process in TEE. This step is often accomplished by working out the mapping 
from virtual address to cache lines [9].  
The second step is to fill all cache lines. The spy process fills the cache with its 
own memory so that each cache line that can be used by the victim is filled with 
memory contents from the address space of the attacker [9].  
The third step is to trigger the execution of the victim process in TEE. When the 
victim process is running, cache lines that were previously occupied by the attackers 
are evicted to the cache memory, such as a DRAM. As a result, the cache 
configuration from the attacker’s perspective has changed because of the execution of 
the victim process. Since this step is non-interruptible due to the protection of 
TrustZone, it is more challenging for this attack to succeed without fine grained 
information on the victim process cache access [9]. 
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The fourth step is to measure the state change in cache configuration after the 
victim finishes its execution in TEE. For each cache line that was previously primed 
in the second step, the time to execute memory load instruction is measured. If the 
time it takes to load the cache memory into register is short, then cache lines of which 
the cache memory is mapped to was not evicted by the victim process. Once the 
results are recorded for all the cache memory locations that were primed, the attack 
goes back to the second step and continues to collect more side-channel information 
[10]. 
The fifth step is to analyse the collected channel information to recover secret 
information such as cryptographic keys within the secure domain. 
 
Proposed Countermeasures against TruSpy  
In this paper, the proposed countermeasure against the TruSpy side-channel attack 
addresses largely two points. One point is to remove or mitigate cache contention 
about the shared memory. Another point is to adjust timing of data paths for non-
detecting cache transition. 
 
Zero Contention in Cache Lines 
In the above TruSpy modelling, this attack begins due to contention regarding shared 
cache lines between REE and TEE. Accordingly, if we remove the contention 
between REE and TEE, TruSpy side-channel attack can be blocked. 
 
Hardware Zero Contention Scheme 
To achieve zero contention between REE and TEE, we suggest a separate cache 
memory hardwaredly. In an embodiment, the cache memory is divided from fixed 
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REE-only cache lines and fixed TEE-only cache lines to remove or reduce the 
contention between REE and TEE with respect to the shared cache lines. For example, 
the fixed REE-only cache lines and the fixed TEE-only cache lines are hardware-
implemented in the cache memory to achieve the zero contention, referring to figure 5. 
 
Software Zero Contention Scheme 
In another embodiment, an allocation of REE addresses and TEE addresses is fixed 
according to the cache policy. REE addresses and TEE address are separated from 
each other, referring to figure 6. REE addresses correspond first cache lines in the 
cache memory, and TEE addresses correspond second physical cache lines. The first 
cache lines and the second cache lines are not shared, but separated. In this case, the 
attacker cannot access and fill cache lines corresponding to the TEE logical addresses. 
But not to limited, various schemes can be introduced about configuration of the 
cache memory or assignment the logical address for zero contention. 
 
Timing Attack Countermeasure 
In TruSpy Attack, this timing attack can be performed by sensing state change of a 
target cache line. Especially, the attacker tries to detect the cache line change by 
measuring the transition time to load cache data from the cache memory to the 
register. Then, we must have no difference between TEE load time and REE load time 
for prevent this timing side-channel attack. 
 
REE Data Path Delay Scheme 
Generally, TrustZone technology determines REE resource access or TEE resource 
access according to NS-bit. REE has longer data path latency than that of TEE 
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because TEE performs at least one operation in a cryptography function. Then the 
attacker performs a timing side-channel attack by using this delay time between REE 
and TEE. Therefore we suggest that data path latencies of REE and TEE should be set 
to equal or similar to each other. In figure 7, data path of REE is configured to include 
a countermeasure circuit for timing attack CTA. For example, CTA may be a delay 
circuit (eg. flip-flop configuration) to have almost no difference in data path latency 
between TEE and REE.  
We supposed that the shared memory of TrustZone is DRAM. Firstly, in a read 
operation, read data from DRAM may be one of secure data and non-secure data. The 
secure data is transferred to TEE via TEE data path and non-secure data is transferred 
to REE via REE data path. The read data from DRAM includes NS-bit, which 
indicates TEE data path or REE data path. MUS selects whether one of REE data path 
and TEE data path is connected to CPU according to the NS-bit. 
Referring to Figure 7, the shown REE data path includes CTA. Accordingly 
data latency of REE data path is equal or similar to that of TEE data path until the 
read data arrive at CPU. For example, decryption time by AES decrypt is equal or 
similar to delay time by CTA. 
Secondly, in a write operation, NS-bit indicates REE data path or TEE data path. 
Similarly, data latency of REE data path is equal or similar to that of TEE data path 
until the write data arrive at DRAM, referring to figure 8. For example, encryption 
time by AES encrypt is equal or similar to delay time by CTA. 
 
TEE Parallel Data Path Scheme 
Also, the intended data path delay in REE may have a bad effect. To solve this 
problem, we suggest parallel data paths in TEE. For example, due to implemented 
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parallel crypto circuits, we can screen time difference between REE data path and 
TEE data path.  
In read operation, non-secure data from DRAM is transferred to CPU of REE 
via REE data path, referring to figure 9. Also, secure data from DRAM is transferred 
to CPU of TEE via TEE data path having parallel AES Decryptors. AES Decryptors 
perform parallel decryption operation on the read data from DRAM. MUX selects one 
of non-secure data of REE data path and secure data of TEE data path according to 
NS-bit. Data of TEE data path are output from AES Decryptors. Accordingly data 
latency of REE data path can be same or similar to that of TEE data path until the read 
data arrives at CPU. 
In write operation, non-secure data from CPU is transferred to DRAM of REE 
via REE data path, referring to figure 10. Also secure data from CPU is transferred to 
TEE via TEE data path h having parallel AES Encrypts. AES Encryptors perform 
parallel encryption operation on the write data from CPU. MUX selects one of non-
secure data of REE data path and secure data of TEE data path according to NS-bit. 
Write data of TEE data path are outputted from AES encrypts. Accordingly data 
latency of REE data path can be equal or similar to that of TEE data path until the 
write data arrive at CPU. 
 
TEE Integrity Enhancement using Clark-Wilson Model 
Recently, Kaiqiang Li, Hao Feng, Yahui Li, and Zhiwei Zhang established the model 
of information flow control, and designed information flow control policies of MMR 
and Guard, which make all the communication data pass security audit and 
retransmission controlled by information flow control mechanism and credible 
components to meet the multilevel security requirements. The model and method 
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effectively guarantee the confidentiality of the information flow in MILS using Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) model [11]. 
The Clark-Wilson model was described by David D. Clark and David R. 
Wilson [10]. This Clark-Wilson model introduces a way to formalize the notion of 
information integrity, especially as compared to the requirements for multi-level 
security (MLS) systems.  
Clark and Wilson argue that the existing integrity models such as Biba model 
were better suited to enforcing data integrity rather than information confidentiality. 
The Biba model is more clearly useful in, for example, banking classification systems 
to prevent the untrusted modification of information and the tainting of information at 
higher classification levels, respectively. Instead, Clark–Wilson model is more clearly 
applicable to business and industry processes in which the integrity of the information 
content is paramount at any level of classification.  
The heart of the Clark-Wilson model is a relationship between a user and a set 
of programs (i.e., TPs) that operate on a set of data items (e.g., UDIs and CDIs). The 
components of such a relation, taken together, are referred to as a Clark–Wilson triple, 
referring to figure 11. Also the Clark-Wilson model must ensure that different entities 
are responsible for manipulating the relationships between principals, transactions, 
and data items. For example, a user capable of certifying or creating a relation should 
not be able to execute the programs specified in that relation. The Clark-Wilson 
model consists of two sets of rules: Certification Rules (C) and Enforcement Rules 
(E). The nine rules ensure the external and internal integrity of the data items [12].  
The Clark-Wilson security model is based on preserving information integrity 
against the malicious attempt of tampering data. The security model maintains that 
only authorized users should make and be allowed to change the data, unauthorized 
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users should not be able to make any changes, and the system should maintain 
internal and external data consistency [13]. 
 
Proposed Security Access Control Model 
We assumed that the mobile device having TrustZone is a kind of a multi-level 
security (MLS) system. We proposed security information flow control model to 
enhance the integrity of the information content between REE and TEE based on the 
Clark-Wilson model, and built the information flow control mechanism using 
TrustZone driver and Authentication Tokenization Program (ATP), referring to figure 
12. Generally an integrity level of a component (ex. APP) in REE is lower than that of 
a component (ex. TA) in TEE. Naive APP on REE cannot access a secure memory.  
The proposed ATP may generate a token by communication with the TA in 
TEE, and transfer the token to APP. Then APP can access the secure memory using 
the token.  
For example, if APP wants to write secure data in the secure memory based on 
a request, APP transforms data to be written using the token in the secure memory.  
For example, the transformed data may be obtained by performing a first XOR 
operation on data and the token, referring to figure 13. Then APP transfers the 
transformed data and the token to ATP.  
The transformed data correspond to UDI (unconstrained data item) of Clark-
Wilson Model. ATP verifies the transformed data using the token. If the verification 
is passed, ATP performs a second XOR operation on the transformed data and the 
token to obtain the data to be written in the secure memory. The data correspond to 
CDI (constrained data item) of Clark-Wilson Model. Then the data from ATP is 
transferred to the secure memory via TZ driver of Mobile OS and Trusted OS.  
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Also, the token is generated by TA of TEE and is stored in the secure memory via TA. 
ATP compares the token transferred from APP with the token stored in secure 
memory in the above verification operation, referring to figure 14. Also, the token 
may include time expiration information. ATP may perform the verification operation 
as to whether there is the token or whether the token is valid based on the time 
expiration information. 
Also, ATP verifies whether the token received from APP on REE is available 
by comparing the token from REE with the stored token in TEE.  
Also, ATP can manage the token via the trusted application (TA) on TEE. 
 
Tokenization 
If APP on REE wants to access the secure memory, APP needs to be authenticated by 
ATP, firstly. ATP executes an authentication process using password, biometric 
information, or so on. When authenticated, ATP issues the token via TEE to enhance 
security of information flow from REE to TEE. 
 
Reading from the Secure Memory using the Token 
If APP on REE wants to read data from the secure memory, APP sends a read request 
with the token to ATP, referring to figure 15. ATP verifies the token of the read 
request by comparing the token with the stored token. The above verification is 
passed; ATP sends the read request via TZ to the secure OS and reads data in the 
secure memory in response to the read request. Then ATP performs XOR operation 
on the read data and the token, and sends the XOR operated data to APP. 
 
Writing to the Secure Memory using the Token 
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If APP on REE wants to write data from the secure memory, APP sends a write 
request with the token and original data to ATP, referring to 15. ATP verifies the 
token of the write request by comparing the token with the stored token. The above 
verification is passed; ATP performs XOR operation on the original data and the 
token,  sends the write request and the XOR operated data via TZ to the secure OS 
and writes the XOR operated data in the secure memory in response to the write 
request.  
 
Reading/Writing on TEE 
The security level of TA on TEE is equal to that of the secure memory. Then, TA has 
a privilege for accessing the secure memory without the token.  
Proposed data flow is shown in Fig. 16. Clark-Wilson model allows high level 
security information to low security entity, but not allow the opposite direction to 
appear. Assuming that the subject S1 (ex. APP) is lower than the object 0 (ex. Secure 
Memory), but the subject S1 wants to write data to the object O.  
At this time, the subject S1 needs to request the permission token from ATP. 
After the subject S1 acquires the permission token, then the subject S1 generates 
unconstrained data item 1 (UDI1) by a first XOR operation on data and the token. 
ATP may process information verification procedure (IVP). If verification is passed, 
APT transforms UDI1 into constrained data item 1(CDI1) by a second XOR operation 
on UDI1 and the token stored in the secure memory. Then, CDI1 may be written to 
the object O. Also, we assume that the subject S2 (ex. TA) is equal to the object 0 (ex. 
Secure Memory). Then the subject S2 writes CDI2 to the object O without the token. 
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This token-based access to TEE resource removes or mitigates OPENSSL’s victim on 
TEE by attackers. Then, OPENSSL victim execution is reduced or failed. 
Accordingly, we expect to prevent TruSpy attack. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the 
shared memory of TrustZone.  We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy 
between REE and TEE to prevent TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we suggested 
that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to 
prevent timing side-channel attacks. Also, we proposed security information flow 
control based on the Clark-Wilson model, and built the information flow control 
mechanism using Authentication Tokenization Program (ATP). Accordingly we can 
expect the improved integrity of the information content between REE and TEE on 
mobile devices. 
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Figure 1. Mobile Device Hardware 
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Figure 2. ARM shared DRAM 
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Figure 3. TruSpy Thread Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. TruSpy Attack Flow 
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Figure 5. Hardwaredly Separate Caches 
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Figure 6. Separate Cache Policy 
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Figure 7. Read Path with CTA 
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Figure 8. Write Path with CTA 
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Figure 9. Parallel Decryption in Memory Read 
 
 
PLOS One: Countermeasure against Side-Channel Attack in Shared Memory of TrustZone 
 
 18 
DRAM
AES Encrypt
CPU
Data
Memory Write
NS-bit
AES Encrypt
AES Encrypt
AES Encrypt
MUX
 
Figure 10. Parallel Encryption in Memory Write 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 11. Clark Wilson Model 
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Figure 12. Proposed Access Control in Mobile Device 
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Figure 13.  Proposed Transformation Procedure (TP) based on Clark-Wilson Model  
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Figure 14. Proposed Integrity Verification Procedure (IVP) based on Clark-Wislson Model 
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Figure 15. Proposed Token Issuing Mechanism 
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Figure 16. Proposed Access Control Strategy on Mobile Device 
